If Science Watch’s content usually reflects humankind's higher aspirations to advance knowledge and improve life, then the subject at hand surely represents the opposite impulse: bioterrorism.

Science Watch herewith examines highly cited research on bioterrorism over the last decade. A data extraction based on a special list of pertinent keywords produced upwards of 12,000 bioterrorism-related papers published in Thomson Reuters-indexed journals between 1999 and 2008. From this set of papers, Science Watch identified the most-cited institutions, authors, and journals.

The two tables below rank institutions according to two separate measures: in table #1, by total citations, and, table #1b, by average citations per paper (among those institutions that fielded 25 or more papers pertaining to bioterrorism during the decade). Highly cited authors and journals are highlighted in the table to the right..

The most-cited paper in this collection dates from 2001 and reports the genome sequence of Yersinia pestis, the causative agent of plague (S. Baker, et al., Nature, 413: 523-7, 2001; now cited nearly 500 times). The next-most-cited paper appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine with the succinct title "Anthrax" (T.C. Dixon, et al., 341: 815-26, 1999)—two years before the incidents in the fall of 2001 in which anthrax-tainted mail killed five people; this paper has now been cited more than 400 times.

Ranking at #3 is another report from 1999, published in JAMA: "Smallpox as a biological weapon: Medical and public health management," (M.S. Ascher, et al., 281: 2127-37, 1999; with more than 375 citations to date). This is just one of a prominent core of highly cited JAMA papers published between 1999 and 2002 by the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense, a body whose 20-odd members included academic, government, and military experts in biomedicine, public health, and emergency management. Along with the smallpox study, the Working Group produced similarly titled papers examining the potential bio-weapon implications of anthrax, tularemia, plague, botulinum toxin, and hemorrhagic fever.

Other topics within the larger body of papers include examinations of the specific sequences and basic biochemical actions of anthrax and other agents; the development of bio-sensors and detection devices based on microarrays, nanotubes, and other technologies; assessments of health and environmental fallout from the 9/11 attacks; and general discussions of readiness and emergency management.

Among institutions in table #2 below, the U.S. Army distinguishes itself by the measure of total citations, posting nearly 10,000. Contributing to the high placement is this survey's most-cited author, Arthur M. Friedlander, of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. Among many other papers, Friedlander contributed to the reports from the Working Group on Civilian Biodefense. (Other names among the numerous Working Group contributing authors in the table are Inglesby, Eitzen, Bartlett, Henderson, Parker, Tonat, Russell, Ascher, Perl, Osterholm, Hauer, McDade, Layton, Hughes, and Lillibridge.)

By the measure of citations per paper, The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR) scores highest, thanks in part to its participation in a 2002 report on the sequence of Bacillus anthracis Ames—a strain that causes inhalational anthrax, implicated in the 2001 attacks—and its comparison to closely related bacteria (T.D. Read, et al., Nature, 423: 81-6, 2002, with more than 340 citations). Friedlander also contributed to this report, as did some of the other authors featured here: Timothy D. Read, Philip C. Hanna, and TIGR's then-president, Claire M. Fraser-Liggett.

Christopher King is the Editor of the Science Watch^® Newsletter, Thomson Reuters.

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Table 1a    

 

Table 1b    

 

Table 2:    

KEYWORDS: BIOTERRORISM, TERRORISM, BIOWEAPONS, BIODEFENSE, ANTHRAX, SMALLPOX,TULAREMIA, PLAGUE, U.S. ARMY, THE INSTITUTE FOR GENOMIC RESEARCH, ARTHUR M. FRIEDLANDER, CLAIRE M. FRASER-LIGGETT, WORKING GROUP ON CIVILIAN BIODEFENSE.